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Abstract. We study the Shapley value in weighted voting games. The Shapley
value has been used as an index for measuring the power of individual agents
in decision-making bodies and political organizations, where decisions are made
by a majority vote process. We characterize the impact of changing the quota
(i.e., the minimum number of seats in the parliament that are required to form
a coalition) on the Shapley values of the agents. Contrary to previous studies,
which assumed that the agent weights (corresponding to the size of a caucus or
a political party) are fixed, we analyze new domains in which the weights are
stochastically generated, modeling, for example, elections processes.
We examine a natural weight generation process: the Balls and Bins model, with
uniform as well as exponentially decaying probabilities. We also analyze weights
that admit a super-increasing sequence, answering several open questions per-
taining to the Shapley values in such games.
1 Introduction
Weighted voting is a common method for making group decisions. This is the method
used in parliaments: one can think of the political parties in a parliament as weighted
agents, where an agent’s weight is the number of seats it holds in the parliament.
Power dynamics in electoral systems have been the focus of academic study for sev-
eral decades. One important observation is that the weight of a party is not necessarily
equal to its electoral power. For example, consider a parliament that has three parties,
two with 50 seats, and one with 20 seats. Assuming that a majority of the votes is re-
quired in order to pass a bill, all three parties have the same decision-making power: no
single party can pass a bill on its own, whereas any two parties can. This contrasts the
fact that one of the parties has significantly less weight than the other two. One of the
ar
X
iv
:1
40
8.
04
42
v1
  [
cs
.G
T]
  3
 A
ug
 20
14
2 Joel Oren, Yuval Filmus, Yair Zick, and Yoram Bachrach
most prominent measures of voting power is the Shapley-Shubik power index (also re-
ferred to as the Shapley value); it has played a central role in the analysis of real-life vot-
ing systems, such as the US electoral college [1, 2], the EU council of members [3, 4, 5],
and the UN security council [6].
Empirical studies of weighted voting present an interesting phenomenon: changes
to the quota (i.e., the number of votes required in order to pass a bill, also called the
threshold) can dramatically affect agent voting power. Changes to the quota have been
proposed as a way to correct power imbalance in the EU council of members [4]; this
is because quota changes are perceived as a preferable alternative to changes to agent
weights (as is proposed by [7]), and were thus argued for in [4, 8].
The objective of this paper is to study the effects of changes to the quota on electoral
power as measured by the Shapley-Shubik power index. Previous analytical studies of
power indices as a function of the quota have mostly focused on the following question:
given a set of weights, what would be the effect of changes to the quota on voting
power?
As mentioned, the effect that changing the quota has on the Shapley value has been
studied to some extent. However, as these studies show, relatively little can be said
about these effects in general. Instead of studying arbitrary weight vectors, we assume
that weights are sampled from certain natural distributions. Modeling a parliamentary
election process, we think of voters as casting their ballots according to a prescribed
distribution, that determines the number of seats each party will hold. Using natural
weight generation processes, we analyze the expected behavior of the Shapley value as
a function of the quota. For example, some of our results show that even when weights
are likely to be very similar, some choices of a quota will cause significant differences
in voting power.
Our Contributions Our work focuses on the Balls and Bins model —a model that has
received considerable recent attention in the computer science community [9, 10, 11].
Informally, in this iterative process, in each round a ball is thrown into one of several
bins according to a fixed probability distribution.
In Section 4, we study a simple model, where each ball lands in one of the n bins
uniformly at random. We identify a repetitive fluctuation pattern in the Shapley values,
with cycles of length mn . We show that if the quota is sufficiently bounded away from
the borders of its length-mn cycle, then the Shapley values of all agents are likely to be
very close to each other. On the other hand, we show that due to noise effects, when the
quota is situated close enough to small multiples of mn , the highest Shapley value can
be roughly double than that of the smallest one. In other words, even if one expects that
candidate weights are identical with high probability, choosing a quota near a multiple
of mn may result in a great difference between Shapley values.
To complement our findings for the uniform case, in Section 5 we consider the case
in which the probabilities decay exponentially, with a decay factor no larger than 1/2.
We show that analyzing this case essentially boils down to characterizing the Shapley
values in a game where weights are a super-increasing sequence (Section 6). Our re-
sults significantly strengthen previous results obtained for this case in [12]: we fully
characterize the Shapley value as a function of the quota for the super-increasing case.
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In addition to giving a closed-form formula for the Shapley values, we also provide
conditions for the equality of consecutive agents.
1.1 Related Work
Weighted voting games (WVGs) have been studied extensively, two classic power mea-
sures proposed by [13] and by [6, 14] being the main object of analysis (see [5], [15] and
[16] for expositions). From an economic point of view, the appeal of the Shapley value
is that it is the only division rule that satisfies certain desirable axioms [6]. Computing
Shapley values in WVGs has also been the focus of several studies: power indices have
been shown to be computationally intractable (see [17] for a detailed overview), but
easily approximable. Randomized sampling has been employed in order to efficiently
approximate the Shapley value, with the earliest examples of this technique appears
in [1], with subsequent analysis in [18, 19]. However, this type of analysis employs the
inherent probabilistic nature of power indices, rather than inducing randomness in the
weighted voting game itself.
If one makes no assumptions on weight distributions, very little can be said about
the effects of the quota on WVGs. Indeed, as demonstrated in [20, 21, 12], power mea-
sures are highly sensitive to varying quota values. While [21] presents some preliminary
results on the effects of the quota when weights are sampled from a given distribution,
our work takes a more principled approach to the matter.
Several works have studied the effects of randomization on weighted voting games
from a theoretical, computational and empirical perspective. The earliest study of ran-
domization and its effects on voting power is due to [7], who shows that the Banzhaf
power index scales as the square root of players’ weight when weights are drawn from
bounded distributions.5 [23] shows certain convergence results for power indices, when
players are sampled from some distributions; [24] show that when weights are sampled
from the uniform distribution, the expected Shapley value of a player is proportional
to its weight, assuming that the quota is 50%. [21] considers a model where the quota
is sampled from a uniform distribution, and bounds the variance of the Shapley value
in this setting, both for general weights and for weights sampled from certain distribu-
tions. The effects of changes to the quota have also been studied empirically, mostly in
the context of the EU council of members [8, 3, 4].
2 Preliminaries
General notation Given a vector x ∈ Rn and a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, let x(S) =∑
i∈S xi. For a random variable X , we let E[X] be its expectation, and Var[X] be its
variance. For a set S, we denote by
[
S
k
]
the collection of subsets of S of cardinality k.
The notation T ∈R
[
S
k
]
means that the set T is chosen uniformly at random from
[
S
k
]
.
We let B(n, p) denote the binomial distribution with n trials and success probability p.
We let N (µ, σ2) denote the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. We let
U(a, b) denote the uniform distribution on the interval [a, b].
5 The results shown by Penrose predate the work by Banzhaf, but can be applied directly to his
work; see [22] for details.
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We let Op(·) denote the usual big-O notation, conditioned on a fixed value of p.
In other words, having f(n) = Op(g(n)) means that there exist functions K(·), N(·),
such that for n ≥ N(p), f(n) ≤ K(p) · g(n).
Finally, for a distribution D over R, and some event E , we simplify our notation by
letting Pr[E(D)] = Prx∼D[E(x)]. For example, for a > 0, we can write Pr[B(n, p) ≤
a] = Prx∼B(n,p)[x ≤ a].
Weighted voting games A weighted voting game (WVG) is given by a set of agents
N = {1, . . . , n}, where each agent i ∈ N has a positive weight wi, and a quota (or
threshold) q. Unless otherwise specified, we assume that the weights are arranged in
non-decreasing order, w1 ≤ · · · ≤ wn. For a subset of agents S ⊆ N , we define
w(S) =
∑
i∈S wi.
A subset of agents S ⊆ N is called winning (has value 1) if w(S) ≥ q and is called
losing (has value 0) otherwise.
The Shapley value Let Symn be the set of all permutations of N . Given some permu-
tation σ ∈ Symn and an agent i ∈ N , we let Pi(σ) = {j ∈ N : σ(j) < σ(i)}; Pi(σ)
is called the set of i’s predecessors in σ. Let us write mi(S) to be v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S);
in other words, mi(S) = 1 if and only if v(S) = 0 but v(S ∪ {i}) = 1. If mi(S) = 1,
we say that i is pivotal for S; similarly, we write mi(σ) = mi(Pi(σ)), and say that
i is pivotal for σ ∈ Symn if i is pivotal for Pi(σ). The Shapley-Shubik power index
(often referred to as as the Shapley value in the context of WVG’s) is simply the proba-
bility that i is pivotal for a permutation σ ∈ Symn selected uniformly at random. More
explicitly,
ϕi =
1
n!
∑
σ∈Symn
mi(σ).
Since σ−1(i) is distributed uniformly when σ is chosen at random from Symn, we also
have the alternative formula
ϕi =
1
n
n−1∑
`=0
E
S∈R[N\{i}` ]
mi(S). (1)
Properties of the Shapley value For WVGs, it is not hard to show that wi ≤ wj implies
ϕi ≤ ϕj , and so if the weights are arranged in non-decreasing order, the minimal
Shapley value is ϕ1 and the maximal one is ϕn. Another useful property that follows
immediately from the definitions is that
∑
i∈N ϕi = 1, assuming 0 < q ≤
∑
i∈N wi.
When we want to emphasize the role of the quota q, we will think of the Shapley values
as functions of q: ϕi(q).
3 An Overview of our Results
We begin by briefly presenting our three major contributions.
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The Balls and Bins Distribution: the Uniform Case In this work, we study the effects
of the quota on agents’ voting power, when agent weights are sampled from the balls
and bins distribution. This distribution is appealing, as it can naturally model election
dynamics under plurality voting: consider an election wherem voters vote for n parties;
the weight of each party is determined by the number of votes it receives. If we assume
that each voter will vote for party i with probability pi, party seats are distributed ac-
cording to the balls and bins distribution with the probability vector p. We first study
the case where balls are thrown into bins uniformly at random; that is, voters choose
parties uniformly at random (the impartial culture assumption).
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(a) The Shapley values of agents 1, 10, 20
and 30 in a 30-agent WVG where weights
were drawn from a balls and bins distribu-
tion with m = 10000 balls.
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(b) The Shapley values as a function of the
quota in a 10-agent game where agent i’s
weight is 2i−1.
When weights are drawn from a uniform balls and bins distribution withm balls and
n bins, Shapley values follow a rather curious fluctuation pattern as the quota varies (see
Figure 1a). Note that the fluctuation is quite regular, with power disparity occurring at
regular intervals (these intervals are of length mn ). Our first result (Theorem 4.1) shows
that when we select a quota that is sufficiently far from an integer multiple of mn , all
agents’ Shapley values tend to be the same. When the quota is an integer multiple
of mn , we distinguish between two cases; when the quota is far from the 50% mark,
power disparity is likely to occur, with the weakest agent’s voting power sinking to less
than half that of the strongest (Theorem 4.2). However, disparity is mitigated when the
quota is near the 50% mark (Theorem 4.3). These results indicate that even if weights
are likely to be similar (as is the case for the uniform balls and bins distribution), power
disparity is likely in certain quotas.
The Balls and Bins Distribution: the Exponential Case In Section 5, we explore the
case where the voting probabilities are exponentially increasing, i.e. pipi+1 = ρ for some
fixed constant 0 < ρ < 12 . In this case, we show (Theorem 5.1) that agents’ weights are
very likely to be super-increasing (super-increasing weights were first studied by [12]).
Thus, in order to understand the expected behavior of voting power as a function of
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the quota in the exponential setting, it suffices to characterize the Shapley value for
weighted voting games with super increasing weights.
Super-Increasing Weights Following the crucial observation made in Theorem 5.1, we
complete characterize voting power in WVGs with super-increasing weights in Sec-
tion 6. First we show that in order to compute the Shapley value of an agent under a
super-increasing sequence, it suffices to know his Shapley value when weights are pow-
ers of 2 (Lemma 6.2). This connection leads to a closed-form formula for the Shapley
value when weights are super-increasing (Theorem 6.1). Employing our formula, we
are able to derive some interesting properties of the Shapley values as functions of the
quota for super-increasing sequences. These results generalize those found in [12], pro-
viding a clear understanding of the mechanics of power distribution and the quota for
the case of super-increasing sequences.
We conclude our study with an interesting analysis of ϕi(q) when weights are finite
prefixes of the sequence (2m)∞m=0. The analysis explains in many ways the fractal shape
of ϕi(q) when weights are powers of two, and shows when voting power will increase
or decrease.
4 The Balls and Bins Distribution: the Uniform Case
We now consider a generative stochastic process called the Balls and Bins process. In
its most general form, given a set of n bins and a distribution represented by a vector
p ∈ [0, 1]n such that∑ni=1 pi = 1, the process unfolds in m steps. At every step, a ball
is thrown into one of the bins based on the probability vector p. The resulting weights
are then sorted in non-decreasing order w1 ≤ · · · ≤ wn.
We begin our study of the balls and bins process by considering the most commonly
studied version of the balls and bins model, in which each ball is thrown into one of the
bins with equal probability, i.e., pi = 1/n, for all i ∈ N .
As Figure 1a shows for the case of n = 30, the behavior of the Shapley values
demonstrates an almost perfect cyclic pattern, with intervals of length m/n. As can
be seen in the figure, for quota values that are sufficiently distant from the interval
endpoints, all of the Shapley values tend to be equal (as the Shapley values of the
highest and lowest agents are equal in these regions). As the number of balls grows, all
of the bins tend to have nearly the same number of balls in them; however, low weight
discrepancy does not immediately translate to low power discrepancy: we can guarantee
nearly equal voting power in some quotas, but not in others.
We begin by providing a formula for the differences between two Shapley values.
Lemma 4.1 For all agents i, j ∈ N ,
|ϕj − ϕi| = 1
n− 1
n−2∑
`=0
Pr
S∈R[N\{i,j}` ]
[q −max(wi, wj) ≤ w(S) < q −min(wi, wj)].
We now give a theoretical justification for the near-identity of Shapley values for
quotas that are well-away from integer multiples of mn .
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Theorem 4.1. Let M = m3n3 . Suppose that |q − `mn | > 1√M mn for all integers `. Then
with probability 1− 2( 2e )n, all Shapley values are equal to 1/n.
The idea of the proof is the following. Suppose thatwi ≤ wj . According to Lemma 4.1,
ϕi 6= ϕj only if for some S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, we have q − wj ≤ w(S) < q − wi. For
a fixed set of agents |S| ∈ [N\{i,j}k ] we have S ∼ B(m, k/n) — as each ball en-
ters into one of the bins corresponding to S with probability k/n. As a result, w(S)
is concentrated around the mean km/n. On the other hand q − wj , q − wi ≈ q − mn .
Therefore, if q is far away from (k+1)mn for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 2, then the probability that
q − wj ≤ w(S) < q − wi is very small. The details can be found in the appendix.
Returning to our voting setting, the interpretation of Theorem 4.1 is that if the voter
population is much larger than the number of candidates, and the votes are assumed
to be cast uniformly at random (i.e., a totally neutral distribution of preferences), then
choosing a quota that is well away from a multiple of mn , will most probably lead to an
even distribution of power among the elected representatives (e.g., political parties).
4.1 How Weak Can the Weakest Agent Get in the Uniform Case?
As Theorem 4.1 demonstrates, if the quota is sufficiently bounded away from any inte-
gral multiple of mn , then the distribution of power tends to be even among the agents.
When the quota is close to an integer multiple of mn , it may very well be that the re-
sulting weighted voting game may not display such an even distribution of power, as a
result of weight differences, as a result of the intrinsic “noise” of the process. Figure 1a
provides an empirical validation of this intuition. Motivated by these observations, we
now proceed to study the expected Shapley value of the weakest agent, ϕ1 (recall that
we assume that the weights are given in non-decreasing order).
We now present two contrasting results. Let q = ` · mn , for an integer `. When
` = o(log n), we show that the expected minimal Shapley value is roughly 12n , and so
it is at least half the maximal Shapley value (in expectation).
Theorem 4.2. Let q = ` · mn for some integer ` = o(log n). For m = Ω(n3 log n),
E[ϕ1] = 12n + o(
1
n ).
In contrast, when ` = Ω(n), this effect disappears.
Theorem 4.3. Let q = ` · mn for ` ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that γ ≤ `n ≤ 1 − γ for some
constant γ > 0. Then for m = Ω(n3), E[ϕ1] ≥ 1n −Oγ
(√
logn
n3
)
.
The idea behind the proof of both theorems is the formula forϕ1 given in Lemma 4.2.
In this formula and in the rest of the section, the probabilities are taken over both the
displayed variables and the choice of weights.
Lemma 4.2 Let q = ` · mn , where ` ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. For m = Ω(n3 log n),
E[ϕ1] =
1
2(n− `) −
`
n(n− `) +
1
n− ` PrA∈R[N\{1}`−1 ]
[w(A) + w1 ≥ q]±O
(
1
n2
)
.
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The full details of the proof appear in the appendix.
In order to estimate the expression Pr
A∈R[N\{1}`−1 ][w(A) + w1 ≥ q], we need a good
estimate for w1. Such an estimate is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3 With probability 1−2/n, we have that
√
m logn
3n ≤ mn −w1 ≤
√
4m logn
n .
We obtain this bound by applying the Poisson approximation technique to the Balls
and Bins process, which we now roughly describe. Consider the case of a random event,
defined with respect to the weight distribution induced by the process. The probability
of the event can be well-approximated by the probability of an analogous event, defined
with respect to n i.i.d. Poisson random variables, assuming the event is monotone in the
number of balls.
We can now prove Theorem 4.2.
Proof (of Theorem 4.2). Lemma A.3 (a simple technical result proved in the appendix)
shows that
Pr
A∈R[N\{1}`−1 ]
[w(A) + w1 ≥ q] ≤ n
n− `+ 1 Pr[B(m,
`−1
n ) ≥ q − w1].
The concentration bound on w1 (Lemma 4.3) shows that with probability 1 − 2/n,
q − w1 ≥ (`−1)mn +
√
m logn
3n . Assuming this, a Chernoff bound gives
Pr[B(m, `−1n ) ≥ q − w1] ≤ Pr[B(m, `−1n ) ≥
(`− 1)m
n
+
√
m log n
3n
] ≤ e−m logn/(3n)3(`−1)m/n = o(1),
using ` = o(log n). Accounting for possible failure of the bound on q − w1, we obtain
Pr
A∈R[N\{1}`−1 ]
[w(A) + w1 ≥ q] ≤
(
1− 2
n
)
· o
(
n
n− `
)
+
2
n
· 1 = o(1),
using ` = o(log n). Lemma 4.2 therefore shows that
E[ϕ1] ≤ 1
2(n− `) + o
(
1
n− `
)
+O
(
1
n2
)
=
1
2n
+ o
(
1
n
)
,
since ` = o(log n) implies 1n−` =
1
n +
`
n(n−`) =
1
n + o(
1
n ). Lemma 4.2 also implies a
matching lower bound:
E[ϕ1] ≥ 1
2(n− `) −
`
n(n− `) −O
(
1
n2
)
≥ 1
2n
− o
(
1
n
)
.
uunionsq
In the regime of ` addressed by Theorem 4.2, Pr
A∈R[N\{1}`−1 ][w(A) + w1 ≥ q] was
negligible. In contrast, in the regime of ` addressed by Theorem 4.3,Pr
A∈R[N\{1}`−1 ][w(A)+
w1 ≥ q] ≈ 1/2, as the following lemma, which is proved in the appendix using the
Berry–Esseen theorem, shows.
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Lemma 4.4 Suppose q = `mn for an integer ` satisfying γ ≤ `−1n ≤ 1− γ, and let
tε = Pr
A∈R[N\{1}`−1 ]
[
w(A) + w1 ≥ q : w1 = m
n
− ε
√
m log n
n
]
.
Then for m ≥ 4n3,
tε ≥ 1
2
− ε
2piγ
√
log n
n
− 1
n
.
As Lemma 4.3 shows, 1/3 ≤ ε ≤ 4 with probability 1 − 2/n, which explains the
usefulness of this bound. We can now prove Theorem 4.3.
Proof (of Theorem 4.3). Lemma 4.3 shows that with probability 1 − 2/n, w1 = mn −
ε
√
m logn
n for some 1/3 ≤ ε ≤ 4, in which regime Lemma 4.4 shows that tε ≥
1
2 − 2piγ
√
logn
n − 1n . Accounting for the case in which ε is out of bounds,
Pr
A∈R[N\{1}`−1 ]
[w(A)+w1 ≥ q] ≥
(
1− 2
n
)(
1
2
− 2
piγ
√
log n
n
− 1
n
)
≥ 1
2
− 2
piγ
√
log n
n
− 3
n
.
Substituting this in Lemma 4.2, we obtain
E[ϕ1] ≥ 1
2(n− `) −
`
n(n− `) +
1
n− `
(
1
2
− 2
piγ
√
log n
n
− 3
n
)
−O
(
1
n2
)
=
1
n− ` −
`
n(n− `) −
1
n− `Oγ
(√
log n
n
)
−O
(
1
n2
)
=
1
n
−Oγ
(√
log n
n3
)
.
uunionsq
5 The Balls and Bins Distribution: the Exponential Case
In Section 4, we show that even when the distribution is not inherently biased towards
any agent, substantial inequalities may arise due to random noise. We now turn to study
the case in which the distribution is strongly biased. Returning to our formal definition
of the general balls and bins process, we assume that the probabilities in the vector p
are ordered in increasing order and pipi+1 = ρ, for some ρ < 1/2. We observe that as
m approaches∞, the weight vector follows a power law with probability 1, where for
each i = 1, . . . , n − 1, wiwi+1 = ρ. A closely related family of weight vectors that we
will refer to is the family of super-increasing weight vectors:
Definition 5.1. A series of positive weights w = (w1, . . . , wn) is said to be super-
increasing (SI) if for every i = 1, . . . , n,
∑i−1
j=1 wj < wi.
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The following three results (Lemma 5.1, Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 5.1) show that
for a sufficiently large value of m, estimating the Shapley values in WVGs where the
weights are sampled from an exponential distribution can be reduced to the study of
Shapley values in a game with a prescribed (fixed) SI weight vector; Section 6 studies
power distribution in WVGs with SI weights. The following lemma gives a character-
ization of the necessary size of the voter population, so as to make the weight vector
super-increasing, if the voters vote according to the above exponential distribution.
Lemma 5.1 Assume that m voters submit the votes according to the exponential dis-
tribution over candidates, such that for ρ ∈ (0, 12 ), and the probability that voter j
votes for candidate i is proportional to ρn−i. There is a constant C > 0 such that if
m ≥ Cρ−n(2ρ − 1)−2 log n then the resulting weight vector is super-increasing with
probability 1−O( 1n ). Furthermore, as m→∞, the probability approaches 1.
The proof of the lemma uses a standard concentration bound (see Appendix B).
Before we proceed, it would be helpful to provide some intuition about the behavior
of the Shapley values. Assuming that agent weights are given by an n-length (increas-
ing) sequencew of real-values, consider the set of all distinct subset sums of the weights
S(w) = {s : ∃P ⊆ [n] s.t. s =∑i∈P wn+1−i} (we use wn+1−i instead of wi to make
some formulas below nicer). Furthermore, suppose that the subset sums are ordered in
increasing order; i.e., S(w) = {sj}tj=1, such that sj < sj+1 for 1 ≤ j < t. It is easy
to show, using the definition of the Shapley value, that for any quota q ∈ (sj , sj+1], for
1 ≤ j < t, the Shapley values of every agent i ∈ N remain constant at some value
ϕi(j), defined for the j’th interval. We formalize this intuition in Section 6, where we
give a formula for ϕi(j).
Before we state the formula (Proposition 5.2 below), we need some notation. For
each P ⊆ N , let w˜(P ) = ∑i∈P wn+1−i. For some j, w˜(P ) = sj , where sj ∈ S.
If P 6= N then j < t and so sj+1 = w˜(P+) for some P+ ⊆ N . Write IwP =
(w˜(P ), w˜(P+)]. Then by definition, the intervals IwP partition the interval (0, w(N)].
We can now state the formula for ϕi(j). Given a weight vectorw, let ϕwi (q) denote the
Shapley value of player i when the quota is q and the weights are given by w.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose that w = (w1, . . . , wn) is a SI sequence of weights, and
suppose that q ∈ (0, w(N)], say q ∈ IwP for some P ⊆ N . Write P = {j0, . . . , jr}
in increasing order. If i /∈ P then ϕwn+1−i(q) =
∑
t∈{0,...,r} :
jt>i
1
jt(jt−1t )
. If i ∈ P , say
i = js, then ϕwn+1−i(q) =
1
js(js−1s )
−∑t∈{0,...,r} :
jt>i
1
jt(jt−1t−1 )
.
Suppose that w is generated using a Balls and Bins process with probabilities p, where
p is a SI sequence; then it stands to reason that if a sufficiently large number of balls
is tossed (i.e., m is large enough), then voting power distribution under w will be very
close to power distribution under the weight vector p. This intuition is captured in the
following lemma, which is proved in the appendix.
Lemma 5.2 Suppose that p = (p1, . . . , pn) is a SI sequence summing to 1, and let
w1, . . . , wn be obtained by sampling m times from the distribution p1, . . . , pn.
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Suppose that T ∈ (0, 1], say T ∈ Ip(P ) for some P ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. If the distance
of T from the endpoints p˜(P ), p˜(P+) of Ip(P ) is at least∆ =
√
log(nm)/m then with
probability 1− 2(nm)2 it holds that if w is SI then for all i ∈ N , ϕwi (mT ) = ϕpi (T ).
Combining both lemmas, we obtain our main result on the exponential case of the
Balls and Bins distribution.
Theorem 5.1. Assume that m voters submit the votes according to the exponential dis-
tribution over candidates, such that for ρ ∈ (0, 12 ), and the probability that voter j
votes for candidate i is proportional to ρn−i. Assume further that m ≥ Cρ−n(2ρ −
1)−2 log n, where C > 0 is some global constant.
Suppose that T ∈ (0, 1], say T ∈ Ip(P ) for some P ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. If the distance
of T from the endpoints p˜(P ), p˜(P+) of Ip(P ) is at least∆ =
√
log(nm)/m then with
probability 1−O(1/n) it holds that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ϕwi (mT ) = ϕpi (T ).
Furthermore, for all but finitely many values of T ∈ (0, 1], the probability that
ϕwi (mT ) = ϕ
p
i (T ) tends to 1 as m→∞.
Proof. Lemma 5.1 gives a constant C > 0 such that if m ≥ Cρ−n(2ρ − 1)−2 log n
then w is SI with probability 1 − O(1/n). Hence the first part of the theorem follows
from Lemma 5.2.
For the second part, Lemma 5.1 shows that as m→∞, the probability that w is SI
approaches 1. Suppose now that T is not of the form p˜(P ) (these are the finitely many
exceptions). When m is large enough, the conditions of Lemma 5.2 are satisfied, and
so as m → ∞, the error probability in that lemma goes to 0. The second part of the
theorem follows. uunionsq
The theorem shows that in the case of the exponential distribution, if the number
of balls is large enough then we can calculate with high probability the Shapley values
of the resulting distribution based on the Shapley values of the original exponential
distribution (without sampling). It therefore behooves us to study the Shapley values of
an exponential distribution, or indeed any SI sequence.
6 Super-increasing sequences
In Section 5, we have shown that when the number of voters is large, studying the dis-
tribution of Shapley values when weights are drawn from an exponential balls and bins
distribution boils down to the study of the Shapley values where weights are super-
increasing. This section constitutes a thorough analysis of power distribution when
weights are super-increasing; in particular, we provide strong generalizations of the
results by [20] and [12].
Up to this point, we assumed that the weights are arranged in non-decreasing order.
In order to simplify our formulas, we will somewhat abuse our definitions by assuming
that the weights are rather ordered in non-increasing order, w1 > w2 > · · · > wn > 0.
We also assume that w is a super-increasing sequence; that is, a sequence satisfying
wi >
∑n
j=i+1 wj for all i ∈ N .
When considering different weight vectors, we will use ϕwi (q) for the Shapley value
of agent i under weight vector w and quota q.
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6.1 Reducing super-increasing weight vectors to the case of a power law of 2
While not every quota in the range (0, w(N)] can be expanded as a sum of members of
{w1, . . . , wn}, there are certain naturally defined intervals that partition (0, w(N)]. For
a subset C ⊆ N , define β(C) =∑i∈C 2n−i. Intuitively, we think of β(C) as the value
resulting from the binary characteristic vector of the set of agents C. The purpose of
the following two lemmas is to reduce every super-increasing weight vector to the case
where the weights obey a power-law distribution, with a power of 2.
Lemma 6.1 Let C1, C2 ⊆ N . Then β(C1) < β(C2) if and only if w(C1) < w(C2).
Proof. In order to prove the claim, it suffices to observe adjacent sets C1, C2 ⊆ N ,
i.e., ones satisfying β(C2) = β(C1) + 1. Let ` = max(N \ C1), and define C =
C1 ∩ {1, . . . , ` − 1}. Then C1 = C ∪ {` + 1, . . . , n} and C2 = C ∪ {`}. Therefore
w(C2)−w(C1) = w`−w({`+1, . . . , n}) > 0, since w1, . . . , wn is super-increasing.
uunionsq
For a non-empty set of agents C ⊆ N , we let P− ⊆ N be the unique subset of
agents satisfying β(P−) = β(P )−1. Lemma 6.1 shows that every quota q ∈ (0, w(N)]
belongs to a unique interval (w(P−), w(P )]; we denote P by A(q). We think of A(q)
as an increasing sequence a0, . . . , ar depending on q, for some value of r which also
depends on q. Whenever we write P = {a0, . . . , ar}, we will always assume that
a0 < · · · < ar.
Lemma 6.2 For all agents i ∈ N and quotas q ∈ (0, w(N)], ϕwi (q) = ϕbi (β(A(q))),
where b = (2n−1, . . . , 1).
Proof. Let σ be a random permutation in Symn, and recall that Pi(σ) is the set of
agents appearing before agent i in σ. The Shapley value ϕwi (q) is the probability that
w(Pi(σ)) ∈ [q − wi, q), or equivalently, that q ∈ (w(Pi(σ)), w(Pi(σ)) + wi]. Since
the intervals (w(C−), w(C)] partition (0, w(N)], q is in (w(Pi(σ)), w(Pi(σ)) + wi] if
and only if w(Pi(σ)) ≤ w(A(q)−) and w(A(q)) ≤ w(Pi(σ)∪{i}). Lemma 6.1 shows
that this is equivalent to checking whether β(Pi(σ)) ≤ β(A(q)−) and β(A(q)) ≤
β(Pi(σ) ∪ {i}). Now, note that β(A(q)−) = β(A(q)) − 1, so the above condition
simply states that i is pivotal for σ under b when the quota is β(A(q)). uunionsq
Lemma 6.2 implies that for any super-increasing w, if we wish to compute ϕwi (q), it
is only necessary to find A(q). However, finding A(q) is easy; a greedy algorithm can
find A(q) in linear time (see Appendix C.1). In the special case in which wi = dn−i for
some integer d, there is a particularly simple formula described in Appendix C.2.
We now present a closed-form formula for the Shapley values, whose proof is given
in the appendix. The resulting Shapley values are illustrated in Figure 1.
Theorem 6.1. Consider an agent i ∈ N and a prescribed quota value q ∈ (0, w(N)].
Let A(q) = {a0, . . . , ar}. If i /∈ A(q) then ϕi(q) =
∑
t∈{0,...,r} :
at>i
1
at(at−1t )
. If i ∈ A(q),
say i = as, then ϕi(q) = 1as(as−1s )
−∑t∈{0,...,r} :
at>i
1
at(at−1t−1 )
.
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(c) Shapley values for n = 5, wi =
2−i. Values ϕi(q) for different i are
slightly nudged to show the effects of
Lemma 6.3.
(d) Shapley values ϕ1(q) for n = 5,
wi = 2
−i compared to the limiting
case n =∞.
(e) Shapley values in the limiting case,
wi = 2
−i.
(f) Shapley values in the limiting case,
wi = 3
−i.
Fig. 1: Examples of several Shapley values corresponding to super-increasing se-
quences.
6.2 Properties of the Shapley values
Zuckerman et al. [12] provide a nice characterization of super-increasing sets:
Theorem 6.2 ([12]). If the weights w are super-increasing then for every quota q ∈
(0, w(N)], either ϕ1(q) = ϕ2(q) or ϕ2(q) = ϕ3(q).
In this section, we further generalize this result, using Theorem 6.1. Specifically, as
a consequence of the theorem, we can determine in which cases ϕi(q) = ϕi+1(q). The
results are summarized in the following lemma, which is proved in the appendix. Given
a set S ⊆ N , let Ψi(S) be the indicator variable of i ∈ S; that is, Ψi(S) = 1 if i ∈ S,
and is 0 otherwise.
Lemma 6.3 Given a quota q ∈ (0, w(N)], let A(q) = {a0, . . . , ar}. For each i ∈
N \ {n}, if Ψi(A(q)) = Ψi+1(A(q)) then ϕi(q) = ϕi+1(q). If Ψi(A(q)) = 0 and
Ψi+1(A(q)) = 1 then ϕi(q) ≥ ϕi+1(q), with equality if and only if i + 1 = ar. If
Ψi(A(q)) = 1 and Ψi+1(A(q)) = 0 then ϕi(q) > ϕi+1(q).
For each i ∈ N , let Ψi be the truth value of i ∈ A(q). Lemma 6.3 shows that if
Ψi = Ψi+1 then ϕi(q) = ϕi+1(q). Since there are only two possible truth values, for
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each i ∈ N \ {1, n}, either ϕi−1(q) = ϕi(q) or ϕi(q) = ϕi+1(q). This generalizes
Theorem 6.2.
Since the Shapley values are constant in the interval (w(P−), w(P )], it follows that
in order to analyze the behavior of ϕi(q), one need only determine the rate of increase
or decrease at quotas of the form w(P ) for P ⊆ N . These are given by the following
lemma, proved in the appendix.
Lemma 6.4 Let P ⊆ N be a non-empty set of agents, and let i ∈ N be an agent. If
i /∈ P− then ϕi(w(P−)) < ϕi(w(P )). If i ∈ P− then ϕi(w(P−)) > ϕi(w(P )).
Moreover, |ϕi(w(P )) − ϕi(w(P−))| ≤ 1n ; this inequality is tight only if a) P ={n}. b) i < n and P = {1, . . . , i} or P = {i, n}, or c) i = n and P = {n − 1}.
Otherwise, |ϕi(w(P ))− ϕi(w(P−))| ≤ 1n(n−1) .
6.3 Limiting case
In what follows, we briefly discuss some interesting properties of the Shapley value
for weight vectors that are finite prefixes of an infinite super-increasing sequence. The
full details can be found in Appendix C.6. Section 6.2 shows that the Shapley value be
easily expressed and analyzed when weights are super-increasing. It is in fact useful to
think of classes of super-increasing weights that are finite prefixes of an infinite super-
increasing sequence; one example of such a sequence is
(
2−i
)∞
i=0
. Given an infinite
super-increasing weight sequence w, we refer to the first m elements of w as w|m.
Given an infinite super-increasing sequence w, we can use the closed-form formula we
define for the Shapley value in the finite case in order to derive a value for the infinite
case. We can then define a value for agent i under an infinite sequence w: ϕwi (q). We
show that the two formulas are closely related; one can derive ϕw|mi (q) using ϕ
w
i (q)
(the connection is illustrated in Figure 1); moreover, we show that ϕwi (q) is continuous
in q, and that it takes values of 0 when q approaches 0, and when q approaches
∑∞
i=0 wi.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have studied the Shapley value as a function of the quota under a number of natural
weight distributions. Assuming that weights are drawn from balls and bins distributions
allows us to reason rigourously about the effect of quota changes. We were also able
to completely characterize the case where weights are super-increasing, strongly gen-
eralizing previous work. The take-home message from our work is that changes to the
quota matter, even when weights are nearly identical. Given the relative success of this
analysis, it would be interesting to study other natural weight distributions (the case of
i.i.d. bounded weights is studied in an extended version of this paper [25]). Moreover,
our results show that employing probabilistic approaches to cooperative games (beyond
the case of WVGs) may be a useful research avenue.
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Appendix
A Missing Proofs from Section 4
A.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
We now provide the complete proof of Lemma 4.1
Lemma 4.1 For all agents i, j ∈ N ,
|ϕj − ϕi| = 1
n− 1
n−2∑
`=0
Pr
S∈R[N\{i,j}` ]
[q −max(wi, wj) ≤ w(S) < q −min(wi, wj)].
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that wj ≥ wi, and so ϕj ≥ ϕi. For σ ∈
Symn, let Tij(σ) be the permutation obtained by exchanging agents i and j. Then by
the definition of the Shapley value and by linearity of expectations:
ϕj − ϕi = E
σ∈Symn
(mj(σ)−mi(σ))
= E
σ∈Symn
mj(σ)− E
σ∈Symn
mi(σ) = E
σ∈Symn
(mj(Tij(σ))−mi(σ)).
We proceed to evaluate mj(Tij(σ))−mi(σ). Suppose first that agent i precedes agent
j in σ, so that σ = S i R j U and Tij(σ) = S j R i U (where S,R, and U
form a partition of N \ {i, j}). In this case mj(Tij(σ)) −mi(σ) 6= 0 precisely when
w(S)+wi < q ≤ w(S)+wj , in which case mj(Tij(σ))−mi(σ) = 1; we can rewrite
the condition as w(S) ∈ [q − wj , q − wi).
When agent j precedes agent i in σ, we can write σ = S j R i U and Tij(σ) =
S i R j U . In this case mj(Tij(σ))−mi(σ) 6= 0 precisely when w(S)+wi+w(R) <
q ≤ w(S) + wj + w(R), in which case mj(Tij(σ)) −mi(σ) = 1; we can rewrite the
condition as w(S ∪R) ∈ [q − wj , q − wi).
In order to unify both conditions together, define P ′i (σ) = Pi(σ) \ {j}. Using this
definition, we see thatmj(Tij(σ))−mi(σ) is the indicator of the eventw(P ′i (σ)) ∈ [q−
wj , q−wi). The cardinality |P ′i (σ)| is exactly the position of agent i in the permutation
σ′ obtained by removing agent j from σ, minus one. Since σ is a uniformly random
permutation of N , σ′ is a uniformly random permutation of N \ {j}, and so |P ′i (σ)|
is distributed randomly among {0, . . . , n − 2}. Given |P ′i (σ)|, the set Pi(σ) is chosen
randomly among all subsets of N \ {i, j} of the specified size, yielding our formula.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We give the full proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Let M = m3n3 . Suppose that |q − `mn | > 1√M mn for all integers `. Then
with probability 1− 2( 2e )n, all Shapley values are equal to 1/n.
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In this section, we do not assume that the weights w1, . . . , wn are ordered, in order
to maintain the fact that the weights are independent random variables.
The idea of the proof is to use the following criterion, which is a consequence of
Lemma 4.1:
Proposition A.1. Suppose that for all agents i, j ∈ N and for all subsets S ⊆ N \
{i, j}, we have q /∈ (w(S ∪ {i}), w(S ∪ {j})]. Then all Shapley values are equal to
1/n.
Proof. We show that under the assumption on q, all Shapley values are equal, and so
all must equal 1/n. Suppose that for some agents i 6= j, we have ϕi < ϕj (and so
wi < wj). Lemma 4.1 implies the existence of a set S ⊆ N \{i, j} satisfying q−wj ≤
w(S) < q − wi, or in other words w(S) + wi < q ≤ w(S) + wj . This is exactly what
is ruled out by the assumption on q.
Next, we show that the weights w(S) are concentrated around points of the form
`mn .
Lemma A.1 Suppose that m > 3n2. With probability 1− 2( 2e )n, the following holds:
for all S ⊆ N , |w(S)− |S|mn | ≤
√
3nm.
Proof. The proof uses a straightforward Chernoff bound. We can assume that S 6= ∅
(as otherwise the bound is trivial). For each non-empty set S ⊆ N , the distribution of
w(S) is B(m, |S|n ). Therefore for 0 < δ < 1,
Pr
[∣∣∣∣w(S)− |S|mn
∣∣∣∣ > δ |S|mn
]
≤ 2e− δ
2|S|m
3n .
Choosing δ =
√
3n2
|S|m < 1, we obtain
Pr
[∣∣∣∣w(S)− |S|mn
∣∣∣∣ >√3|S|m] ≤ 2e−n.
Since there are 2n possible sets S, a union bound implies that |w(S)− |S|mn | ≤
√
3nm
with probability at least 1− 2( 2e )n.
This immediately implies Theorem 4.1, as we now show.
Proof (of Theorem 4.1). First, note that M < 1, as otherwise, it would imply that for
all ` = 1, . . . , n, |q − `m/n| ≥ m/n, which is impossible, as every quota in the range
(0,m] is within some integral multiple of m/n. Thus, having M > 1, implies that
m > 3n3 ≥ 3n2, as required by Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.1 shows that with probability 1− 2( 2e )n, for all sets S we have |w(S)−
|S|m
n | ≤
√
3nm. Condition on this event. Suppose, for the sake of obtaining a contradic-
tion, thatϕi < ϕj for some agents i, j. Then Proposition A.1 shows that there must exist
some S ⊆ N \{i, j} such that q ∈ (w(S∪{i}), w(S∪{j})]. Since bothw(S∪{i}) and
w(S ∪ {j}) are√3nm-close to (|S|+1)mn , this implies that |q − (|S|+1)mn | ≤
√
3nm =
1√
M
· mn , contradicting our assumption on q. We conclude that all agents have the same
Shapley value 1/n.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 4.2
We prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2 Let q = ` · mn , where ` ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. For m = Ω(n3 log n),
E[ϕ1] =
1
2(n− `) −
`
n(n− `) +
1
n− ` PrA∈R[N\{1}`−1 ]
[w(A) + w1 ≥ q]±O
(
1
n2
)
.
The proof closely follows the proof sketch in Section 4.1.
We will need the fact that with high probability, w1 is close to m/n.
Lemma A.2 With probability at least 1− 1/n,
m
n
−
√
4m log n
n
≤ w1 ≤ m
n
.
Proof. Clearly w1 ≤ m/n always, so we only need to address the lower bound on w1.
Let w′1, . . . , w
′
n be the loads of the bins before sorting them. The loads w
′
i are indepen-
dent random variables with distribution B(m, 1/n). For each index i, Chernoff’s bound
shows that
Pr
[
w′i <
m
n
−
√
4m log n
n
]
≤ e− 4m logn/n2m/n = 1
n2
.
A union bound shows that with probability 1 − 1/n, all i ∈ N satisfy w′i ≥ mn −√
4m logn
n , and so w1 ≥ mn −
√
4m logn
n .
Below we will be interested in bounding probabilities of the formPr
A∈R[N\{1}k ][P (w(A))]
for predicates P . The following lemma shows how to bound these probabilities from
above.
Lemma A.3 For a weight vector w and S ⊆ N , let E(w(S)) be a random event (i.e.,
some predicate on w(S)), and let 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. Then
Pr
A∈R[N\{1}k ]
[E(w(A))] ≤ n
n− k Pr[E(B(m,
k
n ))].
Also,
Pr
A∈R[Nk ]
[E(w(A))] = Pr[E(B(m, kn ))].
Proof. First, we have
Pr
A∈R[N\{1}k ]
[E(w(A))] = 1(n−1
k
) ∑
A∈[N\{1}k ]
Pr[E(w(A))]
≤ 1(n−1
k
) ∑
A∈[Nk ]
Pr[E(w(A))]
=
n
n− k PrA∈R[Nk ]
[E(w(A))].
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Consider the last expression. Since the probability is over all subsets of N of size k, the
same value is obtained from the unsorted Balls and Bins process (without sorting the
loads). Under this process, w(A) ∼ B(m, kn ) for all A ∈
[
N
k
]
, and so
Pr
A∈R[Nk ]
[E(w(A))] = Pr
w∼B(m, kn )
[E(w)].
This implies the lemma.
Let pk = PrA∈R[N\{1}k ][q − w1 ≤ w(A) < q], and recall that formula (1) shows
that ϕ1 = 1n
∑n−1
k=0 pk. We start by showing that the only non-negligible pk are p`−1
and p`, using a Chernoff bound. The idea is that when k ≥ ` + 1, it is highly unlikely
that w(A) < q, and when k ≤ `− 1, it is highly unlikely that w(A) ≥ q − w1.
Lemma A.4 Suppose that m ≥ 9n2 log n. Then for k ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {` − 1, `} we
have pk ≤ 1/n2, and so
0 ≤ E[ϕ1]− p`−1 + p`
n
≤ 1
n2
.
Proof. Let k ∈ N . Lemma A.3 shows that
pk ≤ nPr[q − w1 ≤ B(m, kn ) < q].
Suppose first that k ≥ `+ 1. Chernoff’s bound shows that
Pr[q−w1 ≤ B(m, kn ) < q] ≤ Pr[B(m, kn ) < kmn −mn ] ≤ e−
(m/n)2
3km/n = e−m/(3nk) ≤ 1
n3
.
Suppose next that k ≤ `−2. Sincew1 ≤ m/n, another application of Chernoff’s bound
gives
Pr[q − w1 ≤ B(m, kn ) < q] ≤ Pr[B(m, kn ) ≥ (`−1)mn ]
≤ Pr[B(m, kn ) ≥ kmn + mn ]
≤ e− (m/n)
2
3km/n = e−m/(3nk) ≤ 1
n3
.
Therefore pk ≤ 1/n2 for all k ∈ N \ {` − 1, `}. The estimate for E[ϕ1] follows from
formula (1).
The next step is to consider the following estimates for p`−1, p`:
p′`−1 = Pr
A∈R[N\{1}`−1 ]
[q − w1 ≤ w(A)],
p′` = Pr
A∈R[N\{1}` ]
[w(A) < q].
The following lemma shows that p′`−1 ≈ p`−1 and p′` ≈ p`.
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Lemma A.5 Suppose that m ≥ 24n2 log n. Then p`−1 ≤ p′`−1 ≤ p`−1 + 1n and
p` ≤ p′` ≤ p` + 2n , and so
− 3
n2
≤ E[ϕ1]−
p′`−1 + p
′
`
n
≤ 1
n2
.
Proof. Clearly p`−1 ≤ p′`−1 and p` ≤ p′`. First,
p′`−1 − p`−1 ≤ Pr
A∈R[N\{1}`−1 ]
[w(A) ≥ q] ≤ nPr[B(m, `−1n ) ≥ q],
using Lemma A.3. Chernoff’s bound shows that
Pr[B(m, `−1n ) ≥ (`−1)mn + mn ] ≤ e−
(m/n)2
3(`−1)m/n = e−m/(3n(`−1)) ≤ 1
n2
.
Similarly,
p′` − p` ≤ Pr
A∈R[N\{1}` ]
[w(A) < q − w1] ≤ nPr[B(m, `n ) < q − w1].
We now need the lower bound onw1 given by Lemma A.2, which holds with probability
1− 1/n:
q − w1 ≤ `m
n
−
(
m
n
−
√
4m log n
n
)
≤ `m
n
− m
2n
,
the latter inequality following from m ≥ 24n2 log n > 16n log n. Assuming the lower
bound on w1,
Pr[B(m, `n ) < q − w1] ≤ e−
(m/(2n))2
3(`−1)m/n = e−m/(12n(`−1)) ≤ 1
n2
.
Therefore
p′` − p` ≤
(
1− 1
n
)
· 1
n2
+
1
n
· 1 < 2
n
.
The formula for E[ϕ1] follows from Lemma A.4.
It remains to relate p′`−1 and p
′
`.
Lemma A.6 Suppose that m ≥ 24n3 log n. Then∣∣∣∣p′` − ( n2(n− `) − `n− ` (1− p′`−1)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1n,
and so
− 4
n2
≤ E[ϕ1]−
(
1
2(n− `) −
`
n(n− `) +
p′`−1
n− `
)
≤ 2
n2
.
22 Joel Oren, Yuval Filmus, Yair Zick, and Yoram Bachrach
Proof. We have
p′` = Pr
A∈R[N\{1}` ]
[w(A) < q]
=
1(
n−1
`
) ∑
A∈[N\{1}` ]
Pr[w(A) < q]
=
1(
n−1
`
) ∑
A∈[N` ]
Pr[w(A) < q]− 1(n−1
`
) ∑
A∈[N\{1}`−1 ]
Pr[w(A) + w1 < q]
=
n
n− ` PrA∈R[N` ]
Pr[w(A) < q]− `
n− `
(
1− Pr
A∈R[N\{1}`−1 ]
[w(A) + w1 ≥ q]
)
=
n
n− ` Pr[B(m,
`
n
) < q]− `
n− ` (1− p
′
`−1),
where the final equality follows from the second part of Lemma A.3. We proceed to
estimate Pr[B(m, `n ) < q] using the Berry–Esseen theorem. The normalized binomial
B(m, `n )− q is a sum of m independent copies of the random variable X with Pr[X =
1− `n ] = `n and Pr[X = − `n ] = 1− `n . The Berry–Esseen theorem states that
|Pr[B(m, `
n
)− q < 0]− Pr[N (0, σ2) < 0]| < ρ
σ3
√
m
,
where σ2 = E[X2] = `n (1 − `n )2 + (1 − `n )( `n )2 = `n (1 − `n ) and ρ = E[|X|3] =
`
n (1− `n )3+(1− `n )( `n )3 = `n (1− `n )[( `n )2+(1− `n )2]. Since Pr[N (0, σ2) < 0] = 1/2,
we conclude that∣∣∣∣Pr[B(m, `n )− q < 0]− 12
∣∣∣∣ < 1√m ( `n )2 + (1− `n )2√ `
n
(
1− `n
) ≤ 2√ nm,
since the denominator is at least
√
1
n (1− 1n ), and the numerator is at most 2(1− 1n )2 ≤
2
√
1− 1n . Since m ≥ 24n3 log n ≥ 4n3, we further have 2
√
n
m ≤ 1n .
The formula for E[ϕ1] follows from Lemma A.5.
Lemma A.6 is simply a reformulation of Lemma 4.2.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Let us recall Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.3 With probability 1−2/n, we have that
√
m logn
3n ≤ mn −w1 ≤
√
4m logn
n .
We already proved the upper bound in Lemma A.2, using a simple union bound. The
lower bound (corresponding to an upper bound on w1) is much more difficult, because
of the dependence between the individual bins. One way to overcome this difficulty is
to use the Poisson approximation, given by the following theorem.
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Theorem A.1 ([10]). Let w1, . . . , wn be sampled according to the Balls and Bins dis-
tribution with m balls, and let X1, . . . , Xn be n i.i.d. random variables sampled from
the distribution Pois(mn ). Let f : R
n → {0, 1} be a boolean function over the weight
vector, such that the probability p(w1, . . . , wn) = Pr[f(w1, . . . , wn) = 1] is mono-
tonically increasing or decreasing with the number of balls. Then p(w1, . . . , wn) ≤
2p(X1, . . . , Xn).
The following lemma completes the proof of Lemma 4.3, since calculation shows
that for all n ≥ 1,
m
n
√
log(n/ log(2n))
m/n
=
√
m log(n/ log(2n))
n
≥
√
m log n
3n
.
(In fact, the minimum of log(n/ log(2n))logn is obtained for n = 3, in which case it is roughly
0.47.)
Lemma A.7 Let λ = mn . For any ε ≤
√
log( nlog(2n) )
λ , Pr[w1 > λ(1− ε)] ≤ 1n .
Proof. We define n i.i.d random variables X1, . . . , Xn, sampled from the distribution
Pois(λ). We first derive a concentration bound on miniXi, after which we will make
use of Theorem A.1 to obtain the desired result. By the definition of the Poisson distri-
bution,
Pr[min
i
Xi > t] = Pr[X1 > t]
n ≤ Pr[X1 6= t]n ≤
(
1− e−λλ
t
t!
)n
≤
(
1− e−λ
(
eλ
t
)t)n
.
The last inequality is due to the fact that t! ≥ ( te)t, by Stirling’s approximation. Setting
t = (1− ε)λ, we get
Pr[min
i
Xi > (1− ε)λ] ≤
(
1− e−λ
(
eλ
(1− ε)λ
)(1−ε)λ)n
=
(
1− e−λ
(
e
1− ε
)(1−ε)λ)n
≤
(
1− e−ελe(1−ε)ελ
)n
=
(
1− e−ε2λ
)n
≤ e−ne−ε
2λ
.
The second inequality follows from the inequality 11−x ≥ ex, for |x| < 1. The third
inequality follows from the inequality 1− x ≤ e−x.
Now, for any ε ≤
√
log( nlog(2n) )
λ , we have
e−ne
−ε2λ ≤ e−ne
− log( nlog(2n) )
= e− log(2n) =
1
2n
.
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A simple coupling argument shows that Pr[mini wi > (1−ε)λ] is monotone increasing
in the number of balls (here, f(w1, . . . , wn) is 1 if and only if mini wi > (1 − ε)λ).
Therefore Theorem A.1 holds, and we have
Pr[min
i
wi > (1− ε)λ] ≤ 2Pr[min
i
Xi > (1− ε)λ] ≤ 1
n
,
which concludes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Lemma 4.4 Suppose q = `mn for an integer ` satisfying γ ≤ `−1n ≤ 1− γ, and let
tε = Pr
A∈R[N\{1}`−1 ]
[
w(A) + w1 ≥ q : w1 = m
n
− ε
√
m log n
n
]
.
Then for m ≥ 4n3,
tε ≥ 1
2
− ε
2piγ
√
log n
n
− 1
n
.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to replace w(A) by the weight of a random set of size
`− 1. A simple coupling argument shows that
tε ≥ Pr
A∈R[ N`−1]
[
w(A) + w1 ≥ q : w1 = m
n
− ε
√
m log n
n
]
= Pr
[
B(m, `−1n ) ≥
(`− 1)m
n
+ ε
√
m log n
n
]
,
using the second part of Lemma A.3.
As in the proof of Lemma A.6, since m ≥ 4n3, we can use the Berry–Esseen
theorem to estimate the latter expression up to an additive error of 1n :
tε ≥ Pr
[
B(m, `−1n ) ≥
(`− 1)m
n
+ ε
√
m log n
n
]
≥ Pr
[
N ( (`−1)mn , (`−1)mn (1− `−1n )) ≥
(`− 1)m
n
+ ε
√
m log n
n
]
− 1
n
.
In order to estimate the latter probability, we use the bound Pr[N (0, 1) ≥ x] ≥ 1/2−
x√
2pi
(for x ≥ 0), which follows from Pr[N (0, 1) ≥ 0] = 1/2 and the fact that the
density of N (0, 1) is bounded by 1/√2pi. In our case,
x = ε
√
m log n
n
/√
(`−1)m
n (1− `−1n ) ≤ ε
√
m log n
n
/√
γ2m = ε
√
log n
γ2n
.
Therefore
tε ≥ 1
2
− ε
2piγ
√
log n
n
− 1
n
.
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B Missing Proofs From Section 5
B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1
Lemma 5.1 Assume that m voters submit the votes according to the exponential dis-
tribution over candidates, such that for ρ ∈ (0, 12 ), and the probability that voter j
votes for candidate i is proportional to ρn−i. There is a constant C > 0 such that if
m ≥ Cρ−n(2ρ − 1)−2 log n then the resulting weight vector is super-increasing with
probability 1−O( 1n ). Furthermore, as m→∞, the probability approaches 1.
Proof. The proof uses Bernstein’s inequality with a subsequent application of the union
bound. Consider a sequence w1 ≤ w2 ≤ · · · ≤ wn. The sequence is clearly super-
increasing if for every i = 2, . . . , n, wi/wi−1 ≥ 2, and w1 > 0. We now lower bound
the probability of this event, by upper-bounding the probability of the following bad
events: Ei is the event that wi < 2wi−1 (for i = 2, . . . , n), and E1 is the event that
w1 = 0. A union bound shows that the sequence w is super-increasing with probability
at least 1−∑ni=1 Pr[Ei].
First note that the probability that voter j votes for candidate i is equal to
pi =
ρn−i∑n
i=1 ρ
n−i =
ρn−i(1− ρ)
1− ρn = Θ(ρ
n−i).
Bounding the probability of E1 is easy:
Pr[E1] = (1− p1)m ≤ e−p1m = e−Θ(ρn−1m).
In order to bound the probability ofEi for i 6= 1, consider the random variableX =
2wi−1−wi. This random variable is a sum ofm i.i.d. random variablesX(1), . . . , X(m)
corresponding to the different voters with the following distribution:
X(j) =

2 w.p. pi−1,
−1 w.p. pi,
0 w.p. 1− pi−1 − pi.
Using the identity pi−1 = ρpi, the moments of X are
E[X] = mE[X(j)] = (2ρ− 1)pim = Θ((2ρ− 1)ρn−im),
Var[X] = m(E[X(j)2]− E[X(j)]2) = (4ρ+ 1)pim− (2ρ− 1)2p2im = O(ρn−im).
Since |X(j) − E[X(j)]| = O(1), Bernstein’s equality gives
Pr[Ei] = Pr[X > 0]
≤ exp−
1
2 E[X]
2
Var[X] +O(E[X])
= exp−Θ((2ρ− 1)
2ρ2(n−i)m2)
O(ρn−im)
= exp−Ω((2ρ− 1)2ρn−im).
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Summarizing,
n∑
i=1
Pr[Ei] ≤ e−Θ(ρn−1m) +
n∑
i=2
e−Ω((2ρ−1)
2ρn−im).
Whenm ≥ Cρ−n(2ρ−1)−2 log n for an appropriate C, all the terms areO(1/n2), and
so the total error probability is O(1/n), proving the first part of lemma. As m → ∞,
all the terms tend to 0, and so the total error probability tends to 0, proving the second
part of the lemma.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Lemma 5.2 Suppose that p = (p1, . . . , pn) is a SI sequence summing to 1, and let
w1, . . . , wn be obtained by sampling m times from the distribution p1, . . . , pn.
Suppose that T ∈ (0, 1], say T ∈ Ip(P ) for some P ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. If the distance
of T from the endpoints p˜(P ), p˜(P+) of Ip(P ) is at least∆ =
√
log(nm)/m then with
probability 1− 2(nm)2 it holds that if w is SI then for all i ∈ N , ϕwi (mT ) = ϕpi (T ).
Proof. Suppose thatw is super-increasing. Lemma 6.1 implies that Iw(P ) = (w˜(P ), w˜(P+)],
since both p and w are super-increasing (a priori, it could be that P+ would have dif-
ferent values when defined with respect to p and to w). The idea of the proof is to show
that with high probability, mT ∈ Iw(P ), and then the lemma follows from Proposi-
tion 5.2. We do that by upper-bounding the probability of the following two bad events:
w˜(P ) ≥ mT and w˜(P+) < mT .
The random variable w˜(P ) is a sum ofm i.i.d. indicator random variables which are
1 with probability p˜(P ). Therefore E[w˜(P )] = mp˜(P ). Hoeffding’s inequality shows
that
Pr[w˜(P ) ≥ mT ] ≤ Pr[w˜(P ) ≥ E[w˜(P )] +m∆] ≤ e−2∆2m.
Similarly Pr[w˜(P+) < mT ] ≤ e−2∆2m. When ∆ ≥√log n/m, both error probabili-
ties are at most 1/(nm)2.
C Missing Proofs from Section 6
C.1 A Greedy Algorithm for Finding A(q)
Given a point q ∈ (0, w(N)] and a vector of super-increasing weights w, it is possible
to find A(q) in time O(n).
Lemma C.1 Algorithm 1 calculates A(q) in linear time.
Proof. As stated, the algorithm does not in fact run in linear time, but it is easy to
modify it so that it does run in linear time. It remains to prove that it calculates A(q)
correctly.
LetA(q) = a0, . . . , ar, so thatA(q)− = a0, . . . , ar−1, ar+1, . . . , n. Denote byAi
the value of A in the algorithm after i iterations of the loop. We prove by induction on i
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thatAi = A(q)∩{1, . . . , i}, which shows that the algorithm returnsA(q). The inductive
claim trivially holds for i = 0. Assuming that Ai−1 = A(q) ∩ {1, . . . , i − 1}, we now
prove that Ai = A(q) ∩ {1, . . . , i}. We consider two cases: i /∈ A(q) and i ∈ A(q). If
i /∈ A(q) then q ≤ w(A(q)) = w(Ai−1)+w(A(q)∩{i, . . . , n}) ≤ w(Ai−1)+w({i+
1, . . . , n}), and so line 5 does not get executed. Suppose now that i ∈ A(q). If ar = i
then q > w(A(q)−) = w(Ai−1) + w({i + 1, . . . , n}), and so line 5 gets executed. If
ar > i then q > w(A(q)−) ≥ w(Ai−1) + wi > w(Ai−1) + w({i + 1, . . . , n}), since
w is super-increasing, and so line 5 gets executed in this case as well.
Algorithm 1 An algorithm for finding A(q)
1: procedure FIND-SET(w, q)
2: A← ∅
3: for i← 1 to n do
4: if q > w(A ∪ {i+ 1, . . . , n}) then
5: A← A ∪ {i}
6: end if
7: end forreturn A
8: end procedure
C.2 Finding A(q) when Weights are wi = dn−i
Lemma C.2 Suppose wi = dn−i for some integer d ≥ 2, and let q ∈ (0, w(N)]. Write
dqe in base d: dqe = (t1 . . . tn)d. If the base d representation only consists of the digits
0 and 1 then A(q) = {i ∈ N : ti = 1}. Otherwise, let ` be the minimal index such
that t` > 1, and let k < ` be the maximal index less than ` satisfying tk = 0 (the proof
shows that such an index exists). Then A(q) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} : ti = 1} ∪ {k}.
Proof. Suppose first that ti ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N , and let Q(q) = {i ∈ N : ti = 1}.
Since dqe ≥ 1, Q(q) 6= ∅. Lemma 6.1 shows that w(Q(q)−) < w(Q(q)) and so
q = w(Q(q)) ∈ (w(Q(q)−), w(Q(q))], showing that A(q) = Q(q).
Suppose next that ` is the minimal index such that t` > 1. If tk = 1 for all k < `
then
q > dqe − 1 ≥
`−1∑
j=1
wj + 2w` − 1 ≥ w(N),
since the fact that the wi are integral and super-increasing implies that
w` ≥
n∑
j=`+1
wj + 1.
We conclude that the maximal index k < ` satisfying tk = 0 exists. Let Q(q) = {i ∈
{1, . . . , k − 1} : ti = 1} ∪ {k}. On the one hand,
q ≤ dqe ≤
∑
j∈Q(q)\{k}
wj + (d− 1)
n∑
j=k+1
wj < w(Q(q)).
28 Joel Oren, Yuval Filmus, Yair Zick, and Yoram Bachrach
On the other hand,
q > dqe − 1 ≥
∑
j∈Q(q)\{k}
wj +
`−1∑
j=k+1
wj + 2w` − 1
≥
∑
j∈Q(q)\{k}
wj +
n∑
j=k+1
wj = w(Q(q)
−).
Therefore A(q) = Q(q).
C.3 Proof of Theorem 6.1
First, we recall the statement of Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.1. Consider an agent i ∈ N and a prescribed quota value q ∈ (0, w(N)].
Let A(q) = {a0, . . . , ar}. If i /∈ A(q) then ϕi(q) =
∑
t∈{0,...,r} :
at>i
1
at(at−1t )
. If i ∈ A(q),
say i = as, then ϕi(q) = 1as(as−1s )
−∑t∈{0,...,r} :
at>i
1
at(at−1t−1 )
.
Proof. Lemma 6.2 shows that ϕwi (q) = ϕ
b
i (β(A(q))), where b = 2
n−1, . . . , 1. There-
fore we can assume without loss generality that w = 2n−1, . . . , 1, i.e., wi = 2n−i, and
that q =
∑
j∈A(q) wj .
Recall that ϕi(q) is the probability that w(Pi(pi)) ∈ [q − wi, q), where pi is chosen
randomly from Symn, and Pi(pi) is the set of predecessors of i in pi. The idea of the
proof is to consider the maximal τ ∈ {1, . . . , r+ 1} such that at ∈ Pi(pi) for all t < τ .
We will show that when i /∈ A(q), each possible value of τ(pi) corresponds to one
summand in the expression for ϕi(q). When i ∈ A(q), say i = as, we will show that
the events that i is pivotal with respect to q and that i is pivotal with respect to q − wi
are disjoint, and their union is an event having probability 1/as
(
as−1
s
)
.
Suppose that i is pivotal for pi and τ(pi) = τ . We start by showing that τ ≤ r, ruling
out the case τ = r + 1. If τ = r + 1 then by definition
w(Pi(pi)) ≥
∑
j∈A(q)
wj = q,
contradicting the assumption w(Pi(pi)) < q. Therefore τ ≤ r, and so aτ is well-
defined. We claim that if k ∈ Pi(pi) for some agent k < aτ then k ∈ A(q). Indeed,
otherwise
w(Pi(pi)) ≥
τ−1∑
t=0
wat + wk ≥
τ−1∑
t=0
wat + waτ−1 >
τ−1∑
t=0
wat +
n∑
j=aτ
wj ≥ q,
again contradicting w(Pi(pi)) < q (the third inequality made use of the fact that w is
super-increasing).
Furthermore, we claim that aτ ≥ i. Otherwise,
w(Pi(pi)) ≤
τ−1∑
t=0
wat +
n∑
j=aτ+1
wj − wi <
τ∑
t=0
wat − wi ≤ q − wi,
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contradicting the assumption w(Pi(pi)) ≥ q − wi.
Summarizing, we have shown that τ ≤ r, aτ ≥ i and
Pi(pi) ∩ {1, . . . , aτ} = {a0, . . . , aτ−1}. (2)
Denote this event Eτ , and call a τ ≤ r satisfying aτ ≥ i legal.
Suppose first that i /∈ A(q). We have shown above that if i is pivotal then Eτ
happens for some legal τ . We claim that the converse is also true. Indeed, given Eτ
defined with respect to a permutation pi, and for some legal τ , the weight of Pi(pi) can
be bounded as follows.
τ−1∑
t=0
wat ≤ w(Pi(pi)) ≤
τ−1∑
t=0
wat +
n∑
j=aτ+1
wj <
τ∑
t=0
wat .
The second inequality follows from the definition of τ , whereas the third inequality
follows as before from the definition of a super-increasing sequence. The upper bound
is clearly at most q, and the lower bound satisfies
τ−1∑
t=0
wat ≥ q −
n∑
j=aτ
wj > q − waτ−1 ≥ q − wi,
since i < aτ .
It remains to calculate Pr[Eτ ]. The event Eτ states that the restriction of pi to
{1, . . . , aτ} consists of the elements {a0, . . . , aτ−1} in some order, followed by i (recall
that i ≤ aτ ). For each of the τ ! possible orders, the probability of this is 1/aτ · · · (aτ −
τ) = (aτ − τ − 1)!/aτ !, and so
Pr[Eτ ] =
τ !(aτ − τ − 1)!
aτ !
=
1
aτ
(
aτ−1
τ
) . (3)
Summing over all legal τ , we obtain the formula in the statement of the theorem. This
completes the proof in the case i /∈ A(q).
Suppose next that i ∈ A(q), say i = as. Since aτ ≥ as = i while i /∈ Pi(pi), we
deduce that τ = s. Therefore the event Es happens. Conversely, when Es happens,
w(Pi(pi)) ≤
s−1∑
t=0
wat +
n∑
j=as+1
wj <
s∑
t=0
wat ≤ q.
Therefore i is pivotal (with respect to q) if and only if Es happens and w(Pi(pi)) ≥
q − wi.
It is easy to check that A(q − wi) = A(q) \ {i} = a0, . . . , as−1, as+1, . . . , ar. The
argument above shows that if i is pivotal with respect to q−wi then for some τ ′ ≥ s+1,
Pi(pi) ∩ {1, . . . , aτ ′} = {a0, . . . , as−1, as+1, . . . , aτ ′−1}.
In particular, the event Es happens. Conversely, when Es happens,
w(Pi(pi)) ≥
s−1∑
t=0
wat ≥ q − was −
n∑
j=as+1
wj > (q − was)− was .
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Therefore i is pivotal with respect to q −wi if and only if Es happens and w(Pi(pi)) <
q − wi. We conclude that
Pr[wi is pivotal with respect to q] = Pr[Es]−Pr[wi is pivotal with respect to q −wi].
Above we have calculated Pr[Es] = 1/as
(
as−1
s
)
, and we obtain the formula in the
statement of the theorem.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 6.3
To prove Lemma 6.3, we will need some combinatorial identities.
Lemma C.3 Let p, t be integers satisfying p > t ≥ 1. Then
1
p
(
p−1
t
) + 1
p
(
p−1
t−1
) = 1
(p− 1)(p−2t−1) .
Proof. The proof is a simple calculation:
1
p
(
p−1
t
) + 1
p
(
p−1
t−1
) = t!(p− t− 1)! + (t− 1)!(p− t)!
p!
=
(t− 1)!(p− t− 1)![t+ (p− t)]
p!
=
(t− 1)!(p− t− 1)!
(p− 1)! =
1
(p− 1)(p−2t−1) .
Lemma C.4 Let p, t, k be integers satisfying p > t ≥ 0 and k ≥ 0. Then
1
p
(
p−1
t
) − k∑
`=1
1
(p+ `)
(
p+`−1
t+`−1
) = 1
(p+ k)
(
p+k−1
t+k
) .
In particular,
1
p
(
p−1
t
) = ∞∑
`=1
1
(p+ `)
(
p+`−1
t+`−1
) .
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. If k = 0 then there is nothing to prove. For
k > 0 we have
1
p
(
p−1
t
)− k∑
`=1
1
(p+ `)
(
p+`−1
t+`−1
) = 1
(p+ k − 1)(p+k−2t+k−1)− 1(p+ k)(p+k−1t+k−1) = 1(p+ k)(p+k−1t+k ) ,
using Lemma C.3. The second expression of the lemma follows from rearranging the
first formula and taking the limit k →∞.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 6.3. First, recall the statement of the lemma.
Lemma 6.3 Given a quota q ∈ (0, w(N)], let A(q) = {a0, . . . , ar}. For each i ∈
N \ {n}, if Ψi(A(q)) = Ψi+1(A(q)) then ϕi(q) = ϕi+1(q). If Ψi(A(q)) = 0 and
Ψi+1(A(q)) = 1 then ϕi(q) ≥ ϕi+1(q), with equality if and only if i + 1 = ar. If
Ψi(A(q)) = 1 and Ψi+1(A(q)) = 0 then ϕi(q) > ϕi+1(q).
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Proof. For the first item, since i+ 1 /∈ A(q) then at > i iff at > i+ 1, and so
ϕi(q) =
∑
t∈{0,...,r} :
at>i
1
at
(
at−1
t
) = ∑
t∈{0,...,r} :
at>i+1
1
at
(
at−1
t
) = ϕi+1(q).
For the second item, suppose that i+ 1 = as. We have
ϕi(q)− ϕi+1(q) =
r∑
t=s
1
at
(
at−1
t
) − [ 1
as
(
as−1
s
) − r∑
t=s+1
1
at
(
at−1
t−1
)]
=
r∑
t=s+1
[
1
at
(
at−1
t
) + 1
at
(
at−1
t−1
)] = r∑
t=s+1
1
(at − 1)
(
at−2
t−1
) ,
using Lemma C.3. Therefore ϕi(q) ≥ ϕi+1(q), with equality if and only if s = r.
For the third item, suppose that i = as. We have
ϕi(q)− ϕi+1(q) = 1
as
(
as−1
s
) − r∑
t=s+1
1
at
(
at−1
t−1
) − r∑
t=s+1
1
at
(
at−1
t
)
=
1
as
(
as−1
s
) − r∑
t=s+1
1
(at − 1)
(
at−2
t−1
) ,
using Lemma C.3. The same lemma also implies that the expression 1/p
(
p
t−1
)
is de-
creasing in p. Since i + 1 /∈ A(q), if as+1 exists then as+1 ≥ as + 2, and in general
as+` ≥ as + `+ 1. Therefore
ϕi(q)−ϕi+1(q) ≥ 1
as
(
as−1
s
)−r−s∑
`=1
1
(as + `)
(
as+`−1
s+`−1
) = 1
(as + r − s)
(
as+r−s−1
r
) > 0,
using Lemma C.4.
For the fourth item, suppose that i = as. We have
ϕi(q)− ϕi+1(q) =
[
1
as
(
as−1
s
) − r∑
t=s+1
1
at
(
at−1
t−1
)]− [ 1
as+1
(
as+1−1
s+1
) − r∑
t=s+2
1
at
(
at−1
t−1
)]
=
1
as
(
as−1
s
) − 1
as+1
(
as+1−1
s+1
) − 1
as+1
(
as+1−1
s
) = 0,
using Lemma C.3 together with as+1 = as + 1.
C.5 Proof of Lemma 6.4
First, let us recall the statement of Lemma 6.4.
Lemma 6.4 Let P ⊆ N be a non-empty set of agents, and let i ∈ N be an agent. If
i /∈ P− then ϕi(w(P−)) < ϕi(w(P )). If i ∈ P− then ϕi(w(P−)) > ϕi(w(P )).
Moreover, |ϕi(w(P )) − ϕi(w(P−))| ≤ 1n ; this inequality is tight only if a) P ={n}. b) i < n and P = {1, . . . , i} or P = {i, n}, or c) i = n and P = {n − 1}.
Otherwise, |ϕi(w(P ))− ϕi(w(P−))| ≤ 1n(n−1) .
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Proof. Define ϕ+ = ϕi(w(P )) and ϕ− = ϕi(w(P−)). Let P = a0, . . . , ar. We have
P− = a0, . . . , ar−1, ar + 1, . . . , n.
Suppose first that i > ar, and let s be the index of i in the sequence P−. According
to Theorem 6.1, ϕ+ = 0 and
ϕ− =
1
i
(
i−1
s
) − n−i∑
`=1
1
(i+ `)
(
i+`−1
s+`−1
) = 1
n
(
n−1
s+n−i
) .
We see that i ∈ P− and ϕ− > ϕ+. Furthermore, |ϕ+−ϕ−| ≤ 1n(n−1) unless s+n−i ∈
{0, n − 1}. If s + n − i = 0 then s = 0 and i = n, implying P− = {n} and so
P = {n − 1}. If s + n − i = n − 1 then s = i − 1 and so P− = 1, . . . , n, which is
impossible.
Suppose next that i = ar. According to the theorem,
ϕ+ − ϕ− = 1
i
(
i−1
r
) − n−i∑
`=1
1
(i+ `)
(
i+`−1
r+`−1
) = 1
n
(
n−1
r+n−i
) .
We see that i /∈ P− and ϕ+ > ϕ−. Furthermore, |ϕ+−ϕ−| ≤ 1n(n−1) unless r+n−i ∈
{0, n− 1}. If r + n− i = 0 then r = 0 and i = n, and so P = {n}. If r + n− i = n
then r = i− 1 and so P = 1, . . . , i.
Finally, suppose that i < ar. If i /∈ P then
ϕ+ − ϕ− = 1
ar
(
ar−1
r
) − n−ar∑
`=1
1
(ar + `)
(
ar+`−1
r+`−1
) = 1
n
(
n−1
r+n−ar
) .
We see that i /∈ P− and ϕ+ > ϕ−. Furthermore, |ϕ+ − ϕ−| ≤ 1n(n−1) unless r +
n − ar ∈ {0, n − 1}. If r + n − ar = 0 then r = 0 and ar = n, and so P = {n}. If
r+n− ar = n− 1 then ar = r+1, which implies P = {1, . . . , r+1}. However, this
contradicts the assumption i /∈ P .
If i < ar and i ∈ P then
ϕ− − ϕ+ = 1
ar
(
ar−1
r−1
) − n−ar∑
`=1
1
(ar + `)
(
ar+`−1
r+`−2
) = 1
n
(
n−1
r+n−ar−1
) .
We see that i ∈ P− and ϕ− > ϕ+. Furthermore, |ϕ+ − ϕ−| ≤ 1n(n−1) unless r + n−
ar − 1 ∈ {0, n− 1}. If r+ n− ar − 1 = 0 then r = 1 and ar = n, and so P = {i, n}.
If r + n− ar − 1 = n− 1 then ar = r, which is impossible.
C.6 A Note on the Limiting Behavior of the Shapley Value under
Super-Increasing Weights
Given a super-increasing sequence w1, . . . , wn (where again, w1 > w2 > · · · > wn)
and somem ∈ N , let us writew|m for (w1, . . . , wm) and [m] for {1, . . . ,m}. We write
ϕ
w|m
i (q) for the Shapley value of agent i ∈ [m] in the weighted voting game in which
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the set of agents is [m], the weights are w|m, and the quota is q. We also write A|m(q)
for the set P ⊆ [m] such that q ∈ (w|m(P−), w|m(P )].
The following lemma relates ϕwi (q) and ϕ
w|m
i (q).
Lemma C.5 Let m ∈ N and i ∈ [m], and let q ∈ (0, w([m])]. Then
ϕ
w|m
i (q) = ϕ
w
i (w(A|m(q))).
Proof. Theorem 6.1 provides a functionΦ such thatϕw|mi (q) = Φ(A|m(q)) andϕwi (w(A|m(q))) =
Φ(A(w(A|m(q)))) = Φ(A|m(q)). We conclude that the Shapley values coincide.
Therefore the plot of ϕw|mi can be readily obtained from that of ϕ
w
i . This suggests
looking at the limiting case of an infinite super-increasing sequence (wi)∞i=1, which is
a sequence satisfying wi > 0 and wi ≥
∑∞
j=i+1 wj for all i ≥ 1. The super-increasing
condition implies that the sequence sums to some value w(∞) ≤ 2w1. Lemma C.5
suggests how to define ϕi in this case: for q ∈ (0, w(∞)) and i ≥ 1, let
ϕ
(∞)
i (q) = limn→∞ϕ
w|n
i (q).
We show that the limit exists by providing an explicit formula for it, as given in The-
orem C.1, which is proved in the appendix. In the theorem, we consider possibly in-
finite subsets P = {a0, . . . , ar} of the positive integers, ordered in increasing order;
when r =∞, the subset is infinite. Also, the notation {a, . . . ,∞} (or {a, . . . , r} when
r =∞) means all integers larger than or equal to a.
Theorem C.1. Let q ∈ (0, w(∞)) and let i be a positive integer.
(a) There exists a non-empty subset of the positive integers P = {a0, . . . , ar} such
that either q = w(P ) or P is finite and q ∈ (w(P−), w(P )], where P− =
{a0, . . . , ar−1} ∪ {ar + 1, . . . ,∞}.
(b) The limit ϕ(∞)i (q) = limn→∞ ϕ
w|n
i (q) exists. When i /∈ P ,
ϕ
(∞)
i (q) =
∑
t∈{0,...,r} :
at>i
1
at
(
at−1
t
) ,
and when i ∈ P , say i = as, then
ϕ
(∞)
i (q) =
1
as
(
as−1
s
) − ∑
t∈{0,...,r} :
at>i
1
at
(
at−1
t−1
) .
Lemma C.5 easily extends to the case n =∞.
Lemma C.6 Let m ≥ 1 be an integer, let i ∈ [m], and let q ∈ (0, w([m])]. Then
ϕ
w|m
i (q) = ϕ
(∞)
i (w(A|m(q))).
Proof. Lemma C.5 shows that for n ≥ m, ϕw|mi (q) = ϕw|ni (w(A|m(q))), and there-
fore ϕw|mi (q) = limn→∞ ϕ
w|n
i (w(A|m(q))) = ϕ(∞)i (w(A|m(q))).
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We conclude by showing that the limiting functions ϕ(∞)i are continuous (see ap-
pendix for the proof).
Theorem C.2. Let i be a positive integer. The functionϕ(∞)i is continuous on (0, w(∞)),
and limq→0 ϕ
(∞)
i (q) = limq→w(∞) ϕ
(∞)
i (q) = 0.
Summarizing, we can extend the functions ϕw|ni to a continuous function ϕ
(∞)
i
which agrees with ϕw|ni on the points w(P ) for P ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. When wi = 2−i then
the plot of ϕ(∞) has no flat areas, but when wi = d−i for d > 2, the limiting function
is constant on intervals (w(P−), w(P )]. This is reflected in Figure 1.
C.7 Proof of Theorem C.1
We start with some preliminary lemmas. For a (possibly infinite) subset P of the posi-
tive integers, define
β∞(P ) =
∑
i∈P
2−i.
We have the following analog of Lemma 6.1.
Lemma C.7 Suppose P1, P2 are two subsets of the positive integers. Then β∞(P1) ≤
β∞(P2) if and only if w(P1) ≤ w(P2). Furthermore, if β∞(P1) < β∞(P2) then
w(P1) < w(P2).
Proof. Suppose that β∞(P1) ≤ β∞(P2) and P1 6= P2. Let i = min(P2 \ P1). Then
w(P2)− w(P1) ≥ wi −
∞∑
j=i+1
wj ≥ 0.
Equality is only possible if maxP2 = i and P1 = P2 \ {i}∪{i+1, . . . ,∞}. However,
in that case β∞(P1) = β∞(P2).
There is a subtlety involved here: we can have β∞(P1) = β∞(P2) for P1 6= P2.
This is because dyadic rationals (numbers of the form A
2B
) have two different binary
expansions. For example, 12 = (0.1000 . . .)2 = (0.0111 . . .)2. The lemma states (in
this case) that w({1}) ≥ w({2, 3, 4, . . .}), but there need not be equality.
In the sequel, we will use the fact that each real r ∈ (0, 1) has a binary expansion
with infinitely many 0s (alternatively, a set P such that β∞(P ) = r and there are
infinitely many n /∈ P ), and a binary expansion with infinitely many 1s (alternatively,
a set P such that β∞(P ) = r and there are infinitely many n ∈ P ). If r is not dyadic,
then it has a unique binary expansion which has infinitely many 0s and 1s. If r is dyadic,
say r = 12 , then it has one expansion (0.1000 . . .)2 with infinitely many 0s and another
expansion (0.0111 . . .)2 with infinitely many 1s.
The following lemma, which forms the first part of Theorem C.1, describes the
analog of the intervals (w(P−), w(P )] in the infinite case.
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Lemma C.8 Let q ∈ (0, w(∞)). There exists a non-empty subset P of the positive inte-
gers such that either q = w(P ) or P = {a0, . . . , ar} is finite and q ∈ (w(P−), w(P )],
where P− = {a0, . . . , ar−1} ∪ {ar + 1, . . . ,∞}.
Proof. Since q < w(∞), for some m we have q ≤ w([m]). For n ≥ m, let A|n =
A|n(q). Let Q|n be the subset of [n] preceding A|n, and let R|n be the subset of
[n + 1] preceding A|n; here “preceding” is in the sense of X 7→ X−. The interval
(w(Q|n), w(A|n)] splits into (w(Q|n), w(R|n)] ∪ (w(R|n), w(A|n)], and so A|n+1 ∈
{R|n, A|n}. Also β∞(A|n+1) ≤ β∞(A|n), with equality only if A|n+1 = A|n.
We consider two cases. The first case is when for some integer M , for all n ≥ M
we have A|n = A = {a0, . . . , ar}. In that case for all n ≥M ,
r−1∑
t=0
wat +
n∑
t=ar+1
wt < q ≤
r∑
t=0
wat ,
and taking the limit n→∞ we obtain q ∈ (w(A−), w(A)].
The other case is when A|n never stabilizes. The sequence β∞(A|n) is mono-
tonically decreasing, and reaches a limit b satisfying b < β∞(A|n) for all n. Since
w(A|m) ∈ (w(Q|n), w(A|n)] for all integers m ≥ n ≥ 1, Lemma C.7 implies that
b ∈ [β∞(Q|n), β∞(A|n)).
Let L be a subset such that b = β∞(L) and there are infinitely many i /∈ L, and
define L|n = L∩ [n]. We have b ∈ [β∞(L|n), β∞(L|n)+2−n). Therefore Q|n = L|n,
and so q > w(Q|n) = w(L|n). Taking the limit n→∞, we deduce that q ≥ w(L).
If n /∈ L then A|n = Q|n ∪ {n}, and so q ≤ w(A|n) = w(L|n) + wn. Since there
are infinitely many such n, taking the limit n→∞ we conclude that q ≤ w(L) and so
q = w(L).
We can now give an explicit formula for ϕ(∞)i .
Theorem C.1. Let q ∈ (0, w(∞)) and let i be a positive integer.
(a) There exists a non-empty subset of the positive integers P = {a0, . . . , ar} such
that either q = w(P ) or P is finite and q ∈ (w(P−), w(P )], where P− =
{a0, . . . , ar−1} ∪ {ar + 1, . . . ,∞}.
(b) The limit ϕ(∞)i (q) = limn→∞ ϕ
w|n
i (q) exists. When i /∈ P ,
ϕ
(∞)
i (q) =
∑
t∈{0,...,r} :
at>i
1
at
(
at−1
t
) ,
and when i ∈ P , say i = as, then
ϕ
(∞)
i (q) =
1
as
(
as−1
s
) − ∑
t∈{0,...,r} :
at>i
1
at
(
at−1
t−1
) .
We comment that the convergence of the sums in the theorem is guaranteed by
Lemma C.4.
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Proof. The first part has been proved as Lemma C.8, and it remains to prove the second
part.
Suppose first that P is finite P and either q = w(P ) or q ∈ (w(P−), w(P )]. For
all n ≥ maxP , P |n(q) = P , and so Lemma C.5 shows that ϕw|ni (q) = ϕw|maxPi (q).
Therefore the limit exists and equals the stated formula, which is the same as the one
given by Theorem 6.1.
Suppose next that P is infinite and q = w(P ). Consider first the case in which
we can also write q = w(Q) for some finite Q, say Q = {q0, . . . , qu}. Then P =
{q0, . . . , qu−1} ∪ {qu + 1, qu + 2, . . . ,∞}. We now consider several cases.
If i < qu and i /∈ P then i /∈ Q and
ϕ
(∞)
i (q) =
∑
t∈{0,...,u} :
qt>i
1
qt
(
qt−1
t
) = ∑
t∈{0,...,u−1} :
qt>i
1
qt
(
qt−1
t
) + ∞∑
`=1
1
(qu + `)
(
qu+`−1
t+`−1
) ,
using Lemma C.4. The right-hand side is the expression we gave for ϕ(∞)i (w(P )).
If i < qu and i ∈ P , say i = qs, then i ∈ Q and
ϕ
(∞)
i (q) =
1
i
(
i−1
s
)− ∑
t∈{0,...,u} :
qt>i
1
qt
(
qt−1
t
) = 1
i
(
i−1
s
)− ∑
t∈{0,...,u−1} :
qt>i
1
qt
(
qt−1
t
)− ∞∑
`=1
1
(qu + `)
(
qu+`−1
t+`−1
) ,
using Lemma C.4. The right-hand side is the expression we gave for ϕ(∞)i (w(P )).
If i = qu then i ∈ Q and i /∈ P . In that case
ϕ
(∞)
i (q) =
1
i
(
i−1
u
) = ∞∑
`=1
1
(i+ `)
(
i+`−1
u+`−1
) ,
using Lemma C.4. The right-hand side is the expression we gave for ϕ(∞)i (w(P )).
Finally, if i > qu then i /∈ Q and i ∈ P . Suppose that i is the vth member in P . In
that case
ϕ
(∞)
i (q) = 0 =
1
i
(
i−1
v
) − ∞∑
`=1
1
(i+ `)
(
i+`−1
v+`−1
) ,
using Lemma C.4. The right-hand side is the expression we gave for ϕ(∞)i (w(P )).
It remains to consider the case in which q cannot be written as q = w(Q) for
finite Q. In that case, there are infinitely many positive integers n such that n ∈ P
and infinitely many such that n /∈ P . This implies that for every positive integer n,
q ∈ (w(P ∩ [n]), w(P ∩ [n]) + wn), and so P |−n (q) = P ∩ [n]. Lemma 6.4 shows that
|ϕn(q) − ϕn(w(P ∩ [n]))| ≤ 1n . On the other hand, Theorem 6.1 readily implies that
ϕn(w(P ∩ [n])) tends to the expression we gave for ϕ(∞)i (w(P )). We conclude that
ϕn(q) tends to the same expression.
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C.8 Proof of Theorem C.2
First, we recall the statement of Theorem C.2.
Theorem C.2. Let i be a positive integer. The functionϕ(∞)i is continuous on (0, w(∞)),
and limq→0 ϕ
(∞)
i (q) = limq→w(∞) ϕ
(∞)
i (q) = 0.
Proof. Let q ∈ (0, w(∞)). We start by showing that ϕ(∞)i is continuous from the right
at q. Lemma C.8 shows that we can find a subset P such that either q = w(P ) or
q ∈ (w(P−), w(P )]. If q < w(P ) then since ϕ(∞)i is constant on (w(P−), w(P )]
according to Theorem C.1, clearly ϕ(∞)i is continuous from the right at q. Therefore
we can assume that q = w(P ). Since q < w(∞), we can further assume that there are
infinitely many n /∈ P .
Suppose that we have a sequence qj tending to q strictly from the right. For each
j we can find a subset Pj such that either qj = w(Pj) or qj ∈ (w(P−j ), w(Pj)]. We
can assume that the second case doesn’t happen by replacing qj with w(P−j ); the new
sequence still tends to q strictly from the right. So we can assume that qj = w(Pj) >
w(P ). Let k(j) = min(Pj \ P ), and let l(j) > k(j) be the smallest index larger than
k(j) such that l(j) /∈ P . Then
qj − q = w(Pj)− w(P ) ≥ wk(j) −
 ∞∑
t=k(j)+1
wt − wl(j)
 ≥ wl(j).
As j → ∞, l(j) → ∞ and so k(j) → ∞. Therefore we can assume without loss of
generality that k(j) > i for all j. Theorem C.1 then implies that
|ϕ(∞)i (qj)− ϕ(∞)i (q)| ≤
∞∑
s=0
1
(k(j) + s)
(
k(j)+s−1
s
) = 1
k(j)− 1 ,
using Lemma C.4. Since k(j)→∞, ϕ(∞)i (qj)→ ϕ(∞)i (q).
We proceed to show that ϕ(∞)i is continuous from the left at q. Lemma C.8 shows
that we can find a subset P such that either q = w(P ) or q ∈ (w(P−), w(P )]. In
the second case, since ϕ(∞)i is constant on (w(P
−), w(P )] according to Theorem C.1,
clearly ϕ(∞)i is continuous from the left at q. Therefore we can assume that q = w(P ).
Since q > 0, we can further assume that there are infinitely many n ∈ P .
Suppose that we have a sequence qj tending to q strictly from the left. For each j
we can find a subset Pj such that either qj = w(Pj) or qj ∈ (w(P−j ), w(Pj)], and in
both cases qj ≤ w(Pj) < w(P ). Let k(j) = min(P \ Pj), and let l(j) > k(j) be the
smallest index larger than k(j) such that l(j) ∈ P . Then
q − qj ≥ w(P )− w(Pj) ≥ wk(j) + wl(j) −
∞∑
t=k(j)+1
wt ≥ wl(j).
At this point we can prove that ϕ(∞)i (qj)→ ϕ(∞)i (q) as in the preceding case.
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It remains to show that limq→0 ϕ
(∞)
i (q) = limq→w(∞) ϕ
(∞)
i (q) = 0. We start by
showing that limq→0 ϕ
(∞)
i (q) = 0. Let qj be a sequence tending to 0 strictly from
the right. As before, we can assume that qj = w(Pj) for each j. Let k(j) = minPj .
Since qj ≥ wk(j), k(j)→∞. Therefore we can assume without loss of generality that
k(j) > i for all j. Theorem C.1 then implies that
ϕ
(∞)
i (qj) ≤
∞∑
s=0
1
(k(j) + s)
(
k(j)+s−1
s
) = 1
k(j)− 1 ,
using Lemma C.4. Since k(j)→∞, ϕ(∞)i (qj)→ 0.
We finish the proof by showing that limq→w(∞) ϕ
(∞)
i (q) = 0. Let qj be a sequence
tending to M strictly from the left. As before, we can find subsets Pj such that qj ≤
w(Pj) and ϕ
(∞)
i (qj) = ϕ
(∞)
i (w(Pj)). Let k(j) be the minimal k /∈ Pj . Since qj ≤
w(∞) − wk(j), k(j) → ∞. Therefore we can assume without loss of generality that
k(j) > i for all j. Theorem C.1 implies that
ϕ
(∞)
i (qj) ≤
1
i
(
i−1
i−1
) − k(j)−1−i∑
`=1
1
(i+ `)
(
i+`−1
i+`−2
) = 1
k(j)− 1 ,
using Lemma C.4. Since k(j)→∞, ϕ(∞)i (qj)→ 0.
